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ABSTRACT

ARTICLE HISTORY

COVID-19 has placed global and national leadership under a serious
stress test by threatening lives and livelihoods on an unprece
dented scale. South Korea emerged as one of the first countries to
flatten the transmission curve despite its high population density
and proximity to China, without imposing the aggressive lock
downs or complete travel bans that China and many other coun
tries adopted. This paper explores two questions. First, what kind of
institutional and legal foundations explain South Korea’s strong
public health response to the pandemic? Second, from a historical
perspective, South Korea evaded the worst of the SARS outbreak in
2003 yet failed to replicate the success with MERS in 2015. What
explains these fluctuating public health responses within a country
and how did this effect South Korea’s response to COVID-19? This
paper argues that South Korea’s crisis management system devel
oped strategic agility and flexibility in its hierarchical model that
allows crisis-friendly partnerships and swift collaboration among
key actors to manage public policy challenges. Studying South
Korea’s responses to these three outbreaks will not only contribute
to our understanding of cross-national crisis management but also
further our comprehension of South Korea’s evolution in public
health response through analysing intra-national variations.
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Introduction
The globalization of public health has emerged as a topic in policy discourse to reflect the
challenges that transnational public health crises pose to both international and national
governance systems. The outbreak of an infectious disease in one part of the world can
quickly become a threat to all of humanity in the globalized and interconnected contem
porary world. The COVID-19 pandemic not only exposes the varying degrees of effective
ness in countries’ pandemic responses but also highlights the essentiality of national crisis
management systems in disease containment within and across national boundaries.
South Korea emerged as one of the first countries to flatten the transmission curve,
despite its high population density and proximity to China. South Korea was able to do so
without imposing the aggressive lockdowns or complete travel bans that China and many
CONTACT Seung-Youn Oh
Mawr, PA 19010, USA

soh03@brynmawr.edu

© 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

Department of Political Science, Bryn Mawr College, Bryn

2

S.-Y. OH

other countries adopted. Instead, it managed the crisis based on the ‘TRUST’ strategy – an
acronym for ‘Transparency, Robust screening and quarantine, Unique but universally applic
able testing, Strict control, and Treatment’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2020). South Korea’s
strong public health approach to the unparalleled global pandemic is an outstanding
achievement compared to its poor response to the Middle East Respiratory Syndrome
(MERS) outbreak in 2015. South Korea failed to take prompt measures in the initial stage
due to a lack of leadership and situational awareness, which led it to become the largest
epicentre outside the Middle East. The current president Moon Jae-in (who was then the
opposition party leader) criticized the government authorities as ‘super spreaders of MERS’
for their slow-footed response. This raises the question of what transformed the South Korean
government from ‘a super spreader of MERS’ to a ‘super stopper’ of COVID-19 five years later.
Studying the South Korean experience will contribute to our understanding of crossnational crisis management and public governance by explaining the factors behind
effective combat against COVID-19. It will also further our comprehension of the evolution
of South Korea’s crisis management system by examining the intra-national variations in
the ways it handled three infectious diseases in the past two decades. In 2003, South
Korea successfully contained the spread of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)
with only three confirmed cases, yet such success was not replicated with the MERS
outbreak in 2015. What explains South Korea’s varying response to a series of infectious
diseases and what kind of lessons can we derive from that?
In answering these questions, this article argues that South Korea’s crisis management
system developed strategic agility and flexibility in its hierarchical model that allows crisisfriendly partnership and swift collaboration among key actors to manage uncertain public
policy challenges. The initial hierarchical model filled the institutional gap in crisis manage
ment and allowed the top leader to orchestrate emergency operations with strategic
direction and coordination among key stakeholders. Yet, the model’s high reliance on
the top leadership exposed its weakness with the MERS outbreak and opened the doors for
organizational learning towards institutionalization and legalization for ‘agile governance’.
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. The first section discusses the literature
highlighting the importance of an agile governance and organizational learning in crisis
management. The following section illustrates South Korea’s transition from the rigid topdown model to an adaptive and receptive institutionalized collaboration-friendly model.
Five pillars of South Korea’s crisis response system are introduced: 1) a crisis response
agency with a clear chain of command and standard operating procedures at the nationallevel, 2) a situation-adaptive approach to central-local and local-local government colla
boration, 3) swift public-private partnerships that enhance managerial capacity of key
actors, 4) transparent crisis communication that promote a sense of urgency and the
shared goals in the society, and 5) voluntary collaboration from the public. The final section
discusses the public health policy lessons from South Korea’s successful transformation
from a super-spreader of MERS into an effective-fighter of COVID-19.

Literature review: collaborative capacity building through organizational
learning
Contemporary society faces an increasing number of complex problems that go beyond
the scope and capacity of any single organization. Thus, the government’s ability to draw
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timely coordination and collaboration among key governmental and non-governmental
actors are key in solving public policy challenges. Managing emergencies further requires
thorough preparedness and vigilant flexibility that adjust to different crises and evolving
situations on the ground.
A crisis management system refers to the process of developing and implementing
public policies for dealing with unexpected disasters and reducing the risk to human
life: 1) pre-disaster prevention and preparedness, and 2) during- and post-disaster
response and recovery (Petak, 1985). The former is a proactive phase that demands
meticulous planning, whereas the latter is a reactive one that needs an immediate,
flexible, vigilant and spontaneous approach. In the case of (re)emerging infectious dis
eases, the unanticipated aspects of the outbreak, the unknowns of the virus, the speed of
transmission, and intense public fear make efforts in the pre-planning stage only partially
useful and demand immediate measures in mobilizing and deploying necessary resources
to the right places with a limited response time (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Mandell et al.,
2017; O’Toole & Meier, 1999).
Both scholars and practitioners in public governance have widely recognized the
importance of networks among stakeholders and the collaborative capacity to manage
such partnership (Lai, 2012; Moynihan, 2005; Waugh & Streib, 2006). As the centre node of
networks, clear leadership plays a pivotal role in coordinating multiorganizational, inter
governmental, and intersectoral operations to streamline command structures, mobilize
resources without unnecessary inter-agency competition, and facilitate a circular flow of
information. It contributes to sharing goals and responsibilities within networked actors in
generating concerted and all-out efforts for crisis management (Jones et al., 1997; Kapucu,
2006). Leadership also holds the key to organizational learning, which refers to a process
of information exchange, reflection, and feedback on successes and failures that results in
a collective knowledge for organizational improvement and competitiveness (Argote,
2011; Moynihan, 2005). The capacity and willingness of policymakers significantly affects
the extent, the scope, and the types of learning (Huber, 1991). The ultimate efficiency of
the leadership comes down to its ability to mobilize resources and partnerships from local
governments, private actors, and citizens. The article traces the following five factors to
analyse the development of South Korea’s crisis management system (see Table 1).
In South Korea, the landscape of public governance has shifted from a traditional topdown approach to a flexible and adaptive governance model through various opportu
nities for organizational learning. South Korea has been traditionally known as a strong
‘developmental state’ with a hierarchical top-down bureaucratic system and state-centred
relationships with society (Amsden, 1989). Such characteristics may have stunted the
development of horizontal collaboration within the government, yet the ‘embedded
autonomy’ allowed the state to develop institutionalized channels with societal actors
(Evans, 1995). Through economic and political liberalization, the South Korean govern
ment has gradually strengthened its collaborative capacity by drawing support from
actors outside the bureaucracy to deliver public services and handle more complex social
problems.
The South Korean crisis management system has been reconfigured through major
failures of public policy implementations. The failures often create political momentum to
revisit the existing structure and practices, generate an accumulation of new information,
and subsequently lead to organizational changes. South Korea’s first exposure to a major
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Table 1. Five pillars of South Korea’s crisis management system.
Pillars
Control Tower/
Leadership

Functions

– Streamlines command structures in intergovernmental and intersectoral operations
– Mobilizes resources without unnecessary inter-agency competition
– Contributes to sharing goals and responsibilities among stakeholders
Centre-Local/
– Enables division of labour where central government provides broader goals and a framework
Local-Local
for collaboration and local governments takes specific actions catered to the needs of each
Partnership
region
– Permits mobilization of locality-specific resources
Public-Private
– Allows more efficient use of resources and better capacity to plan for and address complex
Partnership
social problems
– Ensures greater competitiveness and higher quality in public services
Crisis
– Consolidates shared goals and collaboration among stakeholders, when transparent and
Communication
timely
– Cultivates a sense of urgency and community that increases people’s trust in government
authorities and willingness to abide by public health guidelines
Public Collaboration – Serves as key in effective prevention and mitigation of public crisis

epidemic with SARS in 2003 demonstrates how the top-down leadership with strong state
capacity became a source for speedy crisis management despite the lack of institutional
settings for infectious disease control and prevention, and addressed the problems of
dispersed responsibility and scattered resources. As such, the hierarchical system can play
a central role as a coordinator of emergency operations to provide strategic direction and
essential links among key stakeholders with a clear chain of communications. It can fill the
institutional and legal gap to set up clear rules for collaboration among key actors, and
create faster and more consistent responses. This should be distinguished from an
authoritarian model where information flows only from the top to bottom, and lowerlevel government officials and social actors have little agency in planning and delivering
operations.
However, its high reliance on the insight and vision of a particular leader lacks
consistency and reliability. Lack of awareness by the leadership or different political
priorities other than infectious disease control could easily lead to a poor response and
significant damage to social stability. South Korea quickly learned such pitfalls of the rigid
hierarchical command-and-control model through the traumatic failure of the MERS
outbreak response but quickly adopted ‘quadruple-loop learning’ by continuously updat
ing internal knowledge and operations with external information from political and social
contexts to improve for the next crisis (Lee et al., 2020). Through iterative and interactive
learning process, South Korea successfully combined centralization with adaptive agility
in its crisis management system based on a flexible organizational structure, collaborative
participation of stakeholders, strategic resource management, and an efficient decisionmaking process (Moon, 2020).

From rigidity to agility: evolution of South Korea’s crisis management
system
From a cross-national perspective, South Korea’s strong public health approach to COVID19 showcases the necessary institutional and legal foundations that other countries could
emulate. From an intra-national perspective, examining South Korea’s evolution in its
public health approach demonstrates the importance of organizational learning and
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taking specific actions to move from a hierarchical, ad-hoc management system to an
institutionalized, agile system. This section will argue how such development took place
within the hierarchical model by replacing a ‘rigid’ top-down system with ‘agile’ govern
ance by increasing collaborative and managerial capacity, rather than demonstrating
a shift from a hierarchical to a horizontal model. When collaborative network-based crisis
management is clearly institutionalized, the hierarchical model can effectively activate
crisis-friendly partnerships among stakeholders and increase managerial capacity. In
doing so, the section will provide a comparative analysis of South Korea’s evolving crisis
response system in three main periods of international public health crisis: SARS in 2003,
MERS in 2015, and COVID-19 in 2020. Given the differences in intensity and duration of the
different epidemics, more focus will be placed on South Korea’s institutionalization after
the MERS outbreak. Yet, examining the evolution of crisis management system from the
SARS case is critical because organizational learning takes place over time through
experiencing successes and failures at critical junctures.
In 2003, South Korea successfully contained SARS early on with only three confirmed
patients when there were more than 8,000 confirmed cases and 813 deaths in 26
countries, of which 7,000 cases were in mainland China and Hong Kong. Despite its
geographical proximity to China and absence of a specialized government agency for
epidemic control, South Korea evaded the worst of SARS because its strong central
leadership had early awareness of the severity of the SARS outbreak in neighbouring
countries and used its capacity for prompt mobilization of resources and experts.
Even prior to the first confirmed case in the country, the then South Korean President,
Roh Moo-Hyun, immediately created the Pan-government Countermeasures Support
Headquarters, led by the Prime Minister. Under the Headquarters, the Office for
Government Policy Coordination, various ministries, the National Institute of Health,
local quarantine stations, and health centres formed a multiorganizational network to
unite efforts to build strong prevention and control measures (see Figure 1). Such critical
prevention measures included investigation for tracing the routes of suspected patients,
quarantines, emergency medical support and an information hotline. The WHO named
South Korea a role model for infectious disease prevention due to its hierarchical model
that filled the gap left by the lack of institutional development and standard operating
procedures.
Yet, the 2015 MERS outbreak exposed the weakness of a system with the leadership as
the sole deciding activator of the pan-governmental crisis management system. South
Korea learned such lessons with the 2015 outbreak of MERS. South Korea suffered the
largest MERS outbreak outside of the Middle East – 186 cases, 38 deaths, and 16,752
people placed under quarantine (WHO, 2014a). South Korea started to make major
changes in the course of fighting MERS to enhance agility for a flexible disaster approach
and facilitate collaboration through institutionalization and legalization.

National-level coordination
In crisis management, clear leadership plays a critical role in coordinating intergovern
mental and intersectoral operations to streamline command structures, mobilize
resources, and create a shared goal among stakeholders to generate all-out efforts for
crisis management. During the MERS outbreak, South Korea initially started with
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Figure 1. South Korea’s ‘centralized’ crisis response system with SARS. Source: Kwon (2003).

inappropriate leadership strategies and a lack of situational awareness. MERS first
appeared in Saudi Arabia in 2012 and continued to spread in the Middle East; by mid2014 there were 852 confirmed cases globally and 301 related deaths reported to the
WHO (WHO, 2016). The WHO issued MERS recommendations in May 2014, suggesting that
countries increase MERS awareness and incorporate prevention and response measures
into existing legal frameworks (WHO, 2014b). Yet, the South Korean authorities failed to
adopt adequate measures and South Korea’s legal framework for disease prevention, the
Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act, had not been updated to include MERS on
the list of infectious diseases at the time of the outbreak in South Korea in May 2015. Thus,
the government lacked a legal basis for an extensive response.
The absence of legal provision, however, was not in stark contrast with the SARS
outbreak in South Korea. What differentiated the two circumstances was the lack of crisisresponse leadership during the MERS outbreak (Bae, 2016; Go & Park, 2018; Jang & Park,
2017). The South Korea Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (KCDC) was created in
2004 as the main epidemic control centre under the Ministry of Health and Welfare. The
KCDC led the response to MERS, but its director-level administrative status lacked inde
pendent decision-making power and a channel for horizontal collaboration with other
ministries. For example, the director could not authorize a shutdown of facilities and other
pre-emptive quarantine measures without higher-up approval. The South Korean autho
rities established several ad-hoc organizations instead of giving more power to the KCDC
or streamlining the chain of command. The Ministry of Health formed the Central MERS
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Management Headquarters, while the former Ministry of Public Safety and Security –
which merged with the Ministry of the Interior in 2017 – created the MERS Response
Support Headquarters. As Figure 2 shows, a total of five competing and overlapping
chains of command sprang up within three weeks without clear guidelines for interagency collaboration. Consequently, the KCDC spent more time explaining situations to
bureaucrats of these five organizations than productively using its expertise and
resources to contain MERS.
The uncoordinated response was aggravated by the absence of an integrated control
tower to oversee the ad-hoc headquarters and coordinate the responsibilities of different
line ministries. The Central Disaster and Safety Countermeasure Headquarters (CDSCH)
headed by the Prime Minister is the highest-level organization in charge of crisis manage
ment, which can facilitate inter-agency cooperation with power that exceeds that of the
heads of the Ministry of Economy and Finance and the Department of Education at the
deputy-prime minister-level. However, the CDSCH could not be formed during the MERS
outbreak because the alert level was never raised beyond caution (yellow) despite its
rapid spread, as its activation required the highest alert level. Setting the proper alert level
is critical because each alert level establishes corresponding response measures, specifies
the roles of relevant institutions, and activates the potential personnel for epidemic
control. In addition, it also accurately signals the severity of the situations to relevant
agencies and the public.
Following the MERS outbreak, the South Korean authorities realized the importance of
an integrated control tower at the national level and the provision of clear manuals. First,
the KCDC gained greater authority over epidemic control issues with an administrative
upgrade from a director to a deputy-ministerial-level agency. Second, the KCDC estab
lished the Emergency Operations Centre, which performs both key preparation and
response functions when infectious diseases emerge in South Korea. The Centre’s
Division of Risk Assessment and International Cooperation facilitates international mon
itoring, collaboration, and informational analysis with international organizations such as
the WHO and Global Health Security Agenda. Third, the KCDC increased the number of
full-time epidemiology investigators and epidemic control officers.

Figure 2. South Korea’s ‘fragmented’ MERS response system (right) and changes of responsible
agencies (left). Source: Ministry of Health and Welfare (2016).
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The South Korean government raised its national alert level with COVID-19 more
quickly than it did with MERS. The level was raised to attention (blue) on January 3rd,
2020, three days after COVID-19 was reported to the WHO, to caution (yellow) with the
first confirmed case on January 20, and to warning (orange) on January 27 with four
confirmed cases, and finally to the highest alert level of red on February 23 with the
massive outbreak in Daegu city. With the country on red alert, the CDSCH, under the
Prime Minister’s leadership, was assembled to discuss drastic measures such as closing
schools, limiting public transportation, and border closures and lockdowns.

Centre-local and local-local government partnership
A rapid response in combating the spread of the virus requires mobilization of localityspecific resources. While the central government provides a broader framework for
epidemic control, the local governments are at the frontlines, taking specific actions for
each region. During the MERS outbreak, a lack of general awareness and the absence of
clear manuals on cooperation undermined effective response and led to the nation-wide
crisis (Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2016). The Prevention of Contagious Disease Act
limited the role of local governments to preventive vaccination. As a result, the central
government took control over the regional responses throughout the country, creating
a rigid and slow-footed response. On several occasions, the KCDC transferred MERS
patients to local medical facilities without notifying the local authorities, causing tensions
with the local leaders and insufficient preparation to cope with the situation.
In 2015, an amendment to the Infectious Disease Control and Prevention Act (IDCPA)
created a legal basis for clear central-local cooperation and explicitly referenced local
governments as a body responsible for disease control measures, while mandating that
the local municipalities have at least two epidemiology investigators (Article 4 & 5). With
an outbreak, provincial and municipal governments can establish Local Disaster and
Safety Management Headquarters to conduct investigations, secure supplies, take neces
sary measures, and repost cases publicly. The IDCPA also allows for the formation of
organizations connecting major local hospitals, medical doctors, and individual experts
for comprehensive and effective disease control (Article 8).
On February 23, at a pan-government meeting, President Moon ordered both the
central and local governments to take unprecedented measures to stop the virus (Dae,
2020). The central-local partnership proved its worth when the city of Daegu confronted
massive community transmission in late February among the members of the Shincheonji
Church of Jesus. The group’s secretive nature and unique service style of sitting on the
floor next to each other heightened government and public concerns. The CDSCH
collected the list of church members and shared with the local governments for manda
tory testing. The KCDC immediately granted local authorities more power to take neces
sary actions without first reporting to KCDC, while transferring the testing kits to local
medical institutes to expedite testing.
Based on this flexible coordination, provincial leaders issued an emergency executive
order for a two-week shutdown of Shincheonji-related facilities and revealed a list of
unofficial Shincheonji churches to break the chain of transmission. Regions with few
church members offered free testing, while larger centres like Daegu announced potential
prosecution of non-cooperative individuals. Such localized strategies enabled the rapid
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testing of all 200,000 Shincheonji members. In early March, church members accounted
for over 60% of all confirmed cases, making Korea one of the more significant flashpoints
of the global virus (Korean Central Disease Control [KCDC], 2020). By March 15, only 41
new cases were reported. In addition to the central-local government cooperation, local
governments supported each other by sharing medical personnel and supplies across
regions. The epidemic response network involving the national KCDC, local governments,
and local medical associations effectively managed the massive outbreak through net
worked collaboration (see Figure 3).

Public-private partnership
Due to the increasingly complex nature of social problems, public services are delivered
through networks of multiple governmental organizations and are often outsourced to
nongovernmental actors including private sectors and communities. The public-private
partnership invites more efficient use of resources, better capacity to plan for and address
complex problems, greater competitiveness, and higher-quality services for customers
(Brass et al., 2004; Huxham & Vangen, 2005). Accordingly, a crisis-friendly public-private
partnership is vital for meeting public demands. To create a comprehensive crisis man
agement system, private medical communities and biotech companies can assist in
developing the best offensive in epidemic control–early and extensive testing, accurate
diagnoses, and scaling and speeding up testing kits. In 2015, South Korea’s public health
system missed an opportunity to detect the outbreak when a newly developed MERS invitro diagnostic kit had not passed clinical trials and could not be used outside of the
KCDC (Kim, 2020). Sticking to the rigid customary regulations led to a lack of testing,
which prompted people infected with MERS to visit multiple hospitals and turned those
hospitals into the country’s main sites of disease transmission (Oh et al., 2018).
After the MERS outbreak, the government learned the importance of public-private
linkages in developing testing resources and enacted an amendment to the Medical

Figure 3. South Korea’s ‘two-top’ crisis response system with COVID-19. Source: Ministry of Health and
Welfare (2020).
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Devices Act (Article 46–2) in June 2016 to promote public-private medical partnerships.
The Act permits the government to authorize the use of unapproved in-vitro diagnostic
test kits in an emergency when no approved diagnostic tests are available. Within one
week of the first confirmed COVID-19 case in South Korea on January 27th, 2020, the
KCDC’s COVID-19 Task Force Team convened a meeting with biotech companies to
develop a test kit and promised the activation of the emergency approval system. The
first authorization of an unlicensed COVID-19 test came on February 4, with three more
test methods approved by the end of February. As a result of public–private partnership,
national and private healthcare providers set up a mostly free testing effort across South
Korea with more than 600 locations that screen up to 20,000 people a day. National
authorities also welcomed innovation by local governments and hospitals such as drivethrough and walk-through test stations. The government provided ex-post approval and
created guidelines to be circulated nationwide (Lee & Lee, 2020).
Two globally lauded recipes for South Korea’s successful battle against the virus, the
testing kit and the drive-through system, are the product of public–private partnership.
The effective 3 T model (Test, Trace, Treat) has allowed South Korea to control the spread
of the virus without drastic measures like complete lockdowns or travel bans. The
situation is often compared with that of the United States, whose first case was detected
the same day as South Korea’s on January 20th. While South Korea streamlined bureau
cracy and public-private partnership based on a sense of urgency, the US struggled to
meet demand for testing as a result of a fragmented bureaucracy and a rigid reliance on
protocol. Instead of drafting the private sector early on to develop tests, U.S. health
officials stuck to time-consuming vetting procedures and relied on test-kits prepared by
the U.S. Centres for Disease Control and Prevention until Feb. 29, but some test-kits were
faulty and not approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.

Crisis communication
Sharing credible information to different agencies and the public in a timely and trans
parent manner is key in consolidating shared goals and cultivating a sense of urgency and
community (Jang & Baek, 2019; Reynolds & Seeger, 2005). First, the circular flow of
information becomes the building block of collaboration. The centre must circulate upto-date information to the local agencies and to the public on the disease, transmission,
and overall strategic planning. The information should flow from the bottom to the top so
that strategic planning can be updated and adjusted.
Second, clear crisis communication contributes to developing and preserving trust
while increasing the government’s authoritativeness within the society (Siegrist & Zingg,
2014). If the government does not provide adequate information, people seek alternative
communication channels to resolve ambiguity and anxiety. This will open doors for
misinformation that further aggravates public panic, causing serious conflicts with public
health guidelines. Third, as shown in various studies on the ‘protection motivation theory’,
people’s risk perception of the severity of a health threat contributes to public participa
tion in adopting public health guidelines and preventive measures (Ibuka et al., 2010;
Rogers, 1975). Circulating consistent information throughout various communication
channels, including traditional media outlets and social media platforms, can increase
people’s risk awareness and encourage their adoption of preventive measures.
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Furthermore, people’s willingness to abide by public health guidelines largely depends on
their trust in the government’s ability to respond to crises. Therefore, disclosing trust
worthy and consistent information promptly and pre-emptively to the public not only
enables the citizens to appropriately assess transmission risks but also to cooperate with
the government measures (Kim et al., 2019).
During the MERS outbreak, the Korean authorities maintained a secretive approach
and withheld key information on patients’ locations, fearing that the public would panic
and demand that hospitals treating MERS patients shut down completely (Noh et al.,
2020). The public began seeking and sharing unofficial information about MERS through
online media and offline social networks, including a citizen-made online MERS map
identifying hospitals and other locations where MERS had been reported. This led to the
spread of fake news, which stoked greater fears among the public and compromised
public health directives. The government relied solely on the traditional media outlet as
a communication channel with the public instead of the social media outlets where most
Korean people consume news and share information. Additionally, several mayors
decided to contradict KCDC guidelines and release information about local MERS patients
based on the public’s ‘right to know’.
Following MERS, the 2015 IDCPA amendment mandated risk communications to the
public. The KCDC established the Office of Risk Communication in 2016 to provide
guidance on how to disclose trustworthy information promptly to local governments,
medical facilities and the public. Since the first confirmed case of COVID-19 in Korea on
20 Januaryth, the KCDC Director, Jung Eun-kyeong, has been leading the country’s daily
briefing with an approval rating of 90% (Jung, 2020). Foreign media lauds her for her
leadership and clear communication that earned public trust (Walker, 2020). The govern
ment’s public information campaigns about the development of COVID-19 and public
health guidelines are circulated through various platforms, including an official website,
TV, social media, text messages, posts and placards to provide consistent guidelines
across various channels. This transparent, versatile, and integrated communication system
functions as a heavy counterweight to rumours, myths, and misinformation.
The revision of the IDCPA also granted public health officials greater access to personal
information on suspected patients, mandating that telecommunication businesses should
agree to health authorities’ and local polices’ requests for locational information on
patients and suspected patients (Article 76–2). This allows public health authorities and
local governments to collaborate to obtain information about patients’ movements
during a public health emergency using closed circuit television footage, cell phone
records, credit card receipts, and other private data. All local governments send out
brief summaries of emergency information to citizens through websites, text messages,
and social media.

Citizens’ participation
The effective prevention and mitigation of infectious diseases cannot take place without
citizens’ participation in complying with public health guidelines, especially when actions
such as wearing masks and self-isolation are difficult to enforce or reward. Knowing the
significance of nonpharmaceutical interventions such as personal sanitization and social
distancing, the South Korean government launched extensive public information
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campaigns to educate the public and promote citizens’ engagement (Moon, 2020). The
public was also actively engaged by learning from the traumatic experience with the
MERS outbreak on the importance of precautionary measures.
In addition to voluntary participation, some citizens took more proactive actions and
developed user-friendly apps to improve the visualization and accessibility of the official
information released by the government authorities. For example, ‘Corona Map’ shows
the confirmed cases by region and ‘Corona 100 m’ alerts users when they breach the 100metre radius of a confirmed patient. How to strike a balance between civil liberties and
public health demands is subject to further discussion – but according to a poll conducted
in February, nearly half of South Korean citizens called for more information disclosure
while only six percent wanted less (Realmeter, 2020). Many South Koreans prioritize public
health over privacy during an outbreak, valuing their freedom of movement (which would
be unavailable during a complete lockdown) more than the privacy protections. As such,
South Korea’s relative success in combating the virus without a complete lockdown is the
result of the government-citizen collaboration that fostered a virtuous cycle. The govern
ment’s effective and agile approach increased citizens’ trust and created a form of
solidarity among citizens that encouraged social collaboration with government
directives.

Summary of integrated framework
South Korea’s crisis management system evolved from a rigid to an agile hierarchical
model through organizational learning to institutionalize collaborative network-based
crisis management and build crisis-friendly partnerships among stakeholders (see Table
2). It is important to note that political leadership and institutionalization of crisis manage
ment systems are not necessarily conflicting strategies. First, moving towards institutio
nalization does not mean less power for the top political leadership. Ultimately, political
will and power to improve organizational efficiency are key to organizational learning
based on past experiences and accumulated institutional memory. The different security
mindsets and strategic visions of the South Korean President can affect situational
awareness of the developing crisis and subsequent activation of the crisis management
system. Jeong and Choi (2017) argue that President Roh Moo-Hyun’s focus on compre
hensive security allowed him to take vigilant action to prevent SARS, while President Park
Geun-Hye’s emphasis on traditional security threats led to a poor response to disasters
and infectious diseases. Following this logic, the current President Moon Jae-in’s attention
to human security, prioritizing people’s lives and safety, contributed to swift control and
response to the COVID-19 outbreak.
Second, stronger institutional and legal foundations of crisis management provide
sustainability of the governance system to weather political leadership changes at the
top. The initial model’s high reliance on top leadership exposed its weakness with the
MERS outbreak and opened the doors for organizational learning towards an institutio
nalized collaborative network. The system in place allowed South Korea’s political leaders
to take a back seat and permit scientific experts to lead the management of the crisis since
January 2020. With the KCDC as the national command centre, both governmental and
non-governmental actors within the network committed to the shared goal of outbreak
control and earned the public trust. Science and politics have been called ‘uneasy
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Table 2. Comparison of South Korea’s public health crisis management (as of November 2020).
Governance Model
Top Leader
Security Focus
Control Tower/
Network leader
Centre-Local/
Local-Local
Partnership
Public-Private
Partnership

Crisis Communication
Trust within the
Network
Shared Goal among
Actors

SARS (2003)
MERS (2015)
A Rigid Hierarchical Command
Roh Moo-Hyun Park Geun-Hye
Comprehensive Traditional security
security
Unified:
Fragmented:
Prime Minister KCDC→ Ministry of Health and
Welfare → Prime Minister
Harmonious
Conflictual
- No significant
need
due to early
prevention
- Excluded
private
hospitals
- Transparent
- Top-down
Strong
Clear manual
with specific
goals
3 (0)

Domestic confirmed
cases (death cases)
Global total confirmed 8,098 (774)
cases (death cases)
Duration
March -July
2003

COVID-19 (2020)
An Agile Hierarchical Collaboration
Moon Jae-In
Human security
Centralized two-top:
- Prime Minister (administration)
- KCDC (disease control)
Harmonious

- Weak due to rigid reliance on - Swift through Emergency Use
protocol
Authorization policy
- Networks with major local hospitals,
medical doctors, and individual experts

- Secretive
- Transparent
- Reliance on traditional media - Circular
- Traditional & social media
Weak
Strong
Weak manual
with no specific goals

Clear manual & consistent reinforcement

186 (38)

34,201 (526)

2,519 (866)

65,760,928 (1,515,990)

May – December 2015

January 2020- (through November 2020)

bedfellows’ (Nature News, 2012). South Korea was able to balance that tricky relationship
without politicizing the pandemic, avoiding a risk that several countries are running
which undermines crisis control efforts.

Concluding remarks
Global and national leaders have been placed under a serious stress test in the face of an
international public health crisis that is unprecedented in living memory. The COVID-19
pandemic highlights the dangers of non-traditional security threats that are transnational
in scope and non-military in nature. The paradox of coping with such a threat is that as
much as it demands global collaboration, the first frontline starts with each nation’s crisis
management. Effective crisis management systems depend on the ability of political
leaders and public officials to fully comprehend the complexities of policy networks and
tap into partnership across the whole nation in making all-out efforts to ameliorate the
public health crisis.
It is often said that the common traits of countries that have effectively managed the
COVID-19 outbreak have shared the experience of SARS. Yet the details of what countries
actually learned and changed have not been fully unpacked. Through the case study of
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South Korea’s development of infectious disease management, this article showed what
public policy lessons South Korea derived from its own success and mistakes through the
SARS and MERS outbreaks, and took significant steps to add agility and increase colla
borative capacity through stronger legal and institutional foundation-building in prepara
tion for tomorrow’s crisis. As a country that made the transition from a rigid to a flexible
hierarchical governance model, and a country with fluctuating experiences with epi
demics, South Korea demonstrates that striking the right balance between politics and
science, and strengthening the appropriate partnerships within society, are integral for
countries to overcome the pandemic. South Korea also presents liberal democratic
countries with an alternative to the top-heavy approach that some countries employed
in response to COVID-19. Transparency, communication, and networked collaboration are
the key weapons in the battle against this invisible, mysterious, and debilitating infectious
disease.
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